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GMOs in Multilateral
Trade
Published on November 19, 2001
Overview
Every World Trade Organization (WTO) member
maintains a large degree of autonomy with respect to the application
of its domestic trade policy. Therefore, a member is certainly
free to outlaw the domestic production of GM products or to
require domestic manufacturers to label GM products for domestic
sale. However, imposing such requirements on imported GM products
may give rise to a trade issue under the WTO Agreement.
The International Food System
GMOs and food safety are regulated by
a number of international bodies.
The Cartagena Protocol to the Convention
on Biological Diversity will cover trans-boundary movement,
transit, handling and use of all sustainable use of biological
diversity and GMOs, also taking into account risks to human
health once 50 countries ratify the agreement. It could be
ratified as soon as 2002, however, to date the agreement is
still awaiting official endorsement.
Two bodies of the United Nations (U.N.),
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and World Health
Organization (WTO) govern Codex Alimentarius, which is the
chief food safety regulating body. Codex Alimentarius has
established standards for food safety risk assessment. In
addition, it is responsible for the food safety aspects of
GMOs. Its regulations and standards are recognized in the
WTO under the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
The WTO is comprised of 140 member countries.
The organization works to develop a liberalized world trading
system. The WTO's top-level decision-making body is the Ministerial
Conference, which meets at least once every two years. A lesser
regulatory body is the General Council (normally ambassadors
and heads of delegations in Geneva, but sometimes officials
sent from members' capitals), which meets several times a
year at the Geneva headquarters. The WTO is the most influential
body in world trade affairs.
With regards to multilateral trade of
GMOs, questions rise about the role of the WTO-based trading
system and whether this system provides the right framework
for addressing such important policy issues. However, in an
international trade dispute over the legality of GMO schemes,
resolution can only be found in the framework of the SPS Agreement
and TBT Agreement due to their sophisticated nature.
The SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement grants flexibility to
individual countries to set and enforce safety requirements
that are crucial to protecting human, animal or plant health,
on the basis of scientific information. This right is granted
to members as long as the measures adopted have minimal negative
effects on trade.
Harmonization, equivalence, consistency
and transparency are the foundations of SPS enforcement. Harmonization
stresses the need for common international heath, safety and
inspection standards for the food and agriculture industry.
Equivalence encourages countries to accept different nations'
standards as long as they are enacted and enforced with the
same goals. Consistency is maintained through a defined order
of operations, scientific method and scientific procedures,
which must be followed in order to ensure that the international
trade of goods does not pose threats to society. Finally,
all decisions under the SPS Agreement affecting international
trade must be based on and supported by consistent scientific
evidence, thereby ensuring transparency.
Details specifically relevant to GMOs
found in the SPS Agreement:
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Appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
(appropriate levels of risk): The level of protection
deemed appropriate by the member establishing a sanitary
or phytosanitary measures to protect human, animal or
plant life or health within its territory.
Article
2
Basic Rights and Obligation:
- Measures
shall be based on scientific principles (except as
provided in Article 5).
- They
shall not unjustifiably discriminate between members
where similar conditions prevail (constituting a disguised
restriction on international trade).
- Measures
shall be in accordance with the obligations of the
members under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate
to the use of SPS measures.
Article
3.3
Harmonization:
- A
member may introduce measures which result in a higher
level of SPS protection than would be achieved by
international standards if that member has scientific
evidence to justify them.
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The SPS Agreement relies heavily on scientific
criteria. If a risk is to serve as the basis for a restriction
on trade, it must be ascertainable. Furthermore, any restriction
of trade must be proven "necessary" to protect human animal
or plant life or health in order to be presumed to be consistent
with both the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994.
TBT
The TBT Agreement explicitly covers mandatory
and voluntary labeling requirements not falling within the
SPS Agreement. The TBT Agreement ensures national security
requirements, prevention of deceptive trade practices, protection
of human health or safety and animal or plant life or health,
or the environment.
The main difference between SPS and
TBT
Under SPS, the only justifications a member
may use for not using international standards are scientific
arguments resulting from an assessment of potential health
risks. However, agreement on TBT allows governments to decide
that international standards are not appropriate for their
reasons, including fundamental technological problems or geographical
factors.
Details specifically relevant to GMOs
found in the TBT Agreement:
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Article
2
Preparation, adoption and application of technical
regulations by central government bodies:
- Imported
goods must face the same standards as domestic goods.
Restrictions should not restrict trade in any way.
Justification for the regulation shall be provided
upon request from other members whose trade may be
significantly affected by the regulation. Equivalent
regulations must be based on performance rather than
design or descriptive characteristics.
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Article 2.1 and 2.2 govern "technical
regulations", including certain mandatory GMO labeling measures.
Products imported from the territory of any member shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
like products of national origin and to like products originating
in any other country and are applicable to "like products".
Unless the production processes are detectable in the final
product these products cannot be discriminated against. Previously
GMOs could not be easily detected. However, advances in technology
have made GMOs increasingly detectable in many finished products.
Labeling schemes are also covered under
article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Under this article it states
that labeling schemes, "not be more trade-restrictive than
necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective taking account
of the risks non-fulfillment would create".
To instate a technical barrier to trade,
such as GM labeling, there must be a "legitimate objective"
to satisfy the TBT, such as "national security requirements;
the prevention of deceptive practices; the protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment".
This non-exclusive list of legitimate objectives does not
explicitly protect a consumer's right to know, nor does it
account for many of the moral, ethical, and religious considerations
often cited in support of GMO labeling.
The Issue
Questions arise when the goal of labeling
is not protection against known health risks but protection
against unknown risks, including environmental risks. The
WTO does not have any regulations that allow trade protection
against unknown risks. This is the main dispute currently
between the U.S. and the E.U.
The U.S. government is unaware of any
evidence that would demonstrate that genetically modified
varieties, such as soybeans and corn, as a class differ from
conventional varieties in composition, nutritional value or
nutritional effects. The U.S. government further has stated
that it had "questions about what the E.U.'s legitimate objectives
are with respect to providing 'proper information to the final
consumer' " and was "concerned that, in fact, the labeling
requirements imposed by the regulation could contribute to
consumer deception.
The U.S. has numerously threatened to
take the GMO dispute with the E.U. to the WTO. The trade and
economic implications for the E.U. are astronomical if the
U.S. can prove that the E.U. has set GMO regulations in an
attempt to distort trade. Even the E.U. Commission admits
there is a serious dilemma, as it believes that blocking of
new GM strains, which have been scenically tested, cannot
be justified under international law.
The European Commission fears that a legal
suit from the biotech firms which, it believes, could force
it to overrule national governments and approve the GM crops
for use anywhere in the E.U. The E.U. Environmental Commissioner
Margot Wallstrom told ministers, "This is problematic and
I don't know how to solve it. We are in an illegal situation."
Conclusion
Aurthor E. Appleton, in his report, The
Labeling of GMO Products Pursuant to the International Trade
Rules, wrote, "The WTO's members are probably not capable,
at this time, of reaching consensus on how to apply WTO rules
to the GMO issue." However, the WTO have attested their capability
to balance social and legal factors in order to reach politically
acceptable solutions. The Shrimp/Turtle case, in which the
US was allowed to prohibit the importation of certain shrimp
and shrimp products from countries that allowed turtles caught
in shrimp nets to be wasted, is evidence of this.
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